The main approach to the negotiation process stems from the influential work of Rubinstein (1982) and his evidence that it can be shown that, in some cases, a process of alternating supply negotiation will produce the same result as Nash`s axiomatic solution. This result gave life to Nash (1950) the early observation that negotiations and rules of negotiations must be the result of an uncooperative game, with the idea that it might be possible to unify negotiation theory and game theory. This approach, called the Nash program, is mainly supported by Binmore (1998), whose evolutionary approach to social contract is based on biological evolution (the game of life) to create the basic conditions of haggling (the game of morality). Both can be modeled as non-cooperative games and later can be modeled as a trading problem. With this approach, Binmore (1998, 2005) claims to be able to show in a robust and non-begging way that Rawls` “justice as fairness” will be the result of this evolutionary negotiation process. At this stage, the debate seems to be focused on two positions that we could describe as robustness and sensitivity. In the view of robustness advocates, regardless of the disagreements of moral agents, we can assume that they are all bound to basic standards of rationality (Moehler 2017, 2013). We should therefore adopt the same fundamental and common conception of rationality and freedom of choice: if people lack more moralistic ideals and virtues, the treaty will still work. It`s going to be tough. From this point of view, we are better off following Hume (1741) if we assume that each person is an instrumental knave, although this maxim is actually false. The position of sensitivity opposes it and holds that if the individuals in I`m not really selfish, the problems of me, of resolutely selfish individuals and their contractual solutions, will not be adapted to it.
Perhaps, while I can count on social trust, selfish entrepreneurs will find it difficult and come to the second best alternative, which would find confident people stupid and ineffective. In fact, the sensitivity theorist may insist that while selfish agents can trade as moral agents, they do so for the wrong reasons (Gaus 2011, 185ff). To explain the idea of the social contract, we analyze contractual approaches in five elements: (1) the role of the social contract (2) the parties (3) Convention (4) the purpose of the agreement (5) what the agreement must show. A lie is a lie, isn`t it? What if it wasn`t that simple? This game reminds you of your moral reactions to various lies Rousseau has two different social theories of contracts. The first is in his essay “Discours on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men,” commonly referred to as the second speech, and is a report on the moral and political evolution of men over time, from a state of nature to modern society. As such, it contains its naturalized presentation of the social contract, which it considers very problematic.